CoreMicroeconomics 3rd Edition by Eric Chiang 1429278471 9781429278478

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Product details:

• ISBN 10:1429278471

• ISBN 13:9781429278478 

• Author:Eric Chiang  

 With this new edition, Eric Chiang transforms CoreMicroeconomics into a text/media resource well attuned to today’s students. Long active in the economics education community, Chiang brings a contemporary teacher’s perspective to the book, supporting a variety of learning approaches by introducing modern topics, new pedagogy, a more visual presentation, and well-integrated media tools. All this while maintaining the book’s defining focus on just those topics instructors cover most often in the course.

CoreMicroeconomics 3rd Table of contents:

 1—Prosperity, inequality, and planetary limits
1.1 Ibn Battuta’s fourteenth-century travels in a flat world
1.2 History’s hockey stick
1.3 Another hockey stick: Climate change
1.4 Inequality in global income
1.5 The continuous technological revolution
1.6 Explaining the flat part of the hockey stick: Production functions and the diminishing average product of labour
1.7 Explaining the flat part of the hockey stick: The Malthusian trap, population, and the average product of labour
1.8 Capitalist institutions
1.9 Structural transformation: From farm to firm
1.10 Capitalism, causation, and history’s hockey stick
1.11 Application: Did the British colonization of India reduce Indian living standards?
1.12 Varieties of capitalism: Institutions, government, and politics
1.13 Economics, the economy, and the biosphere
1.14 Summary
1.15 References
2—Technology and incentives
2.1 Kutesmart automates personalized tailoring
2.2 Economic decisions: Opportunity costs, economic rents, and incentives
2.3 Comparative advantage, specialization, and markets
2.4 Firms, technology, and production
2.5 Modelling a dynamic economy: Technology and costs
2.6 Modelling a dynamic economy: Innovation and profit
2.7 Cheap coal, expensive labour: The Industrial Revolution in Britain and incentives for new technologies
2.8 Economic models: How to see more by looking at less
2.9 Markets, cheap calories, and cotton: The colonies, slavery, and the Industrial Revolution in Britain
2.10 Growth: Escaping the Malthusian trap
2.11 Capitalism + carbon = hockey stick growth + climate change
2.12 How good is the model? Economists, historians, and the Industrial Revolution
2.13 Summary
2.14 References
3—Doing the best you can: Scarcity, wellbeing, and working hours
3.1 Would you work fewer hours if your hourly wage doubled?
3.2 A problem of choice and scarcity
3.3 Goods and preferences
3.4 The feasible set
3.5 Decision-making and scarcity
3.6 Hours of work and technological progress
3.7 Income and substitution effects on hours of work and free time
3.8 Is this a good model?
3.9 Explaining our working hours: Changes over time
3.10 Application: Work hours, free time, and inequality
3.11 Explaining our working hours: Gender and working time
3.12 Explaining our working hours: Differences between countries
3.13 Summary
3.14 References
4—Strategic interactions and social dilemmas
4.1 Climate negotiations: Conflicts and common interests
4.2 Social interactions: Game theory
4.3 Best responses in the rice–cassava game: Nash equilibrium
4.4 Dominant strategy equilibrium and the prisoners’ dilemma
4.5 Evaluating outcomes: The Pareto criterion
4.6 Public good games and cooperation
4.7 Social preferences: Altruism
4.8 Repeated interaction: Social norms, reciprocity, and peer punishment in public good games
4.9 Using experiments to study economic behaviour
4.10 Cooperation, negotiation, and conflicts of interest
4.11 The ultimatum game: Dividing a pie (or leaving it on the table)
4.12 Fair farmers, self-interested students? Experimental results of the ultimatum game
4.13 Coordination games and conflicts of interest
4.14 Modelling the global climate change problem
4.15 Summary
4.16 References
5—The rules of the game: Who gets what and why
5.1 Pirate economics
5.2 Institutions and power
5.3 Evaluating institutions and outcomes: Fairness
5.4 Setting up a model: Technology and preferences
5.5 Institutions, and the case of the independent farmer
5.6 Case 1: Forced labour
5.7 Case 2: A take-it-or-leave-it contract
5.8 Case 3: Bargaining in a democracy
5.9 Case 3 continued: Negotiating to a Pareto-efficient sharing of the surplus
5.10 Lessons on the impact of institutions on efficiency and fairness
5.11 The distribution of income: Endowments, technology, and institutions
5.12 Measuring economic inequality
5.13 Application: A policy to redistribute the surplus and raise efficiency
5.14 Application: Conflicts of interest and bargaining over wages, pollution, and jobs
5.15 Summary
5.16 References
6—The firm and its employees
6.1 Exploding tyres: The mystery unravelled
6.2 The structure of the firm: Owners, managers, and workers
6.3 Other people’s money: The separation of ownership and control
6.4 Finding jobs and filling vacancies
6.5 Managing hiring and quitting: The reservation wage curve
6.6 Getting the work done: Contracts, principals, and agents
6.7 Employment rents: The cost of job loss
6.8 Counting the cost of job loss: Rents and reservation wages
6.9 Getting employees to work hard: The labour discipline model
6.10 Combining recruitment and labour discipline: The wage-setting model
6.11 Putting the wage-setting model to work: Wages, employment, and the rate of unemployment
6.12 How employers exercise power
6.13 Application: The minimum wage
6.14 Application: Another kind of business organization
6.15 Summary
6.16 References
7—The firm and its customers
7.1 Winning brands
7.2 Breakfast cereal: Choosing a price
7.3 Economies of scale and the cost advantages of large-scale production
7.4 Production and costs: The cost function for Beautiful Cars
7.5 Demand, elasticity, and revenue
7.6 Setting price and quantity to maximize profit
7.7 Gains from trade: The surplus and how it is divided
7.8 Price setting, competition, and the market
7.9 How firms differentiate their products
7.10 Markets with few firms: Strategic price setting
7.11 Firms and markets with decreasing long-run average costs
7.12 Influencing market power, and competition policy
7.13 Summary
7.14 References
8—Supply and demand: Markets with many buyers and sellers
8.1 Supply and demand: Markets with many buyers and sellers
8.2 Buying and selling: Demand, supply, and the market-clearing price
8.3 Competitive equilibrium and price-taking
8.4 Firms in competitive equilibrium
8.5 Gains from trade in competitive equilibrium: Allocation and distribution
8.6 Changes in supply and demand
8.7 Short-run and long-run equilibria
8.8 Application: Market dynamics in the oil market
8.9 How competition works: Transforming a cartel coordination game into a competitive prisoners’ dilemma
8.10 Supply, demand, and competitive equilibrium: Is this a good model?
8.11 Application: Why information about prices matters
8.12 The effect of a tax
8.13 Price controls
8.14 Summary
8.15 References
9—Lenders and borrowers and differences in wealth
9.1 The importance of Chambar moneylenders
9.2 Income and wealth
9.3 Borrowing: Bringing consumption forward in time to the present
9.4 Reasons to borrow: The value of spending now
9.5 Application: Discounting, external effects, and the future of the planet
9.6 Lending and storing: Moving consumption to the future
9.7 Investing: Another way to move consumption to the future
9.8 Conflicts over the gains made possible by borrowing and lending
9.9 Borrowers and lenders: A principal–agent problem
9.10 Inequality: Lenders, borrowers, and those excluded from credit markets
9.11 How good is the model?
9.12 A poverty trap for those with limited wealth
9.13 Application: Policies to reduce risk exposure of less well off people
9.14 Summary
9.15 References
10—Market successes and failures: The societal effects of private decisions
10.1 Bananas, fish, and cancer
10.2 The external effects of pollution: Private and social costs and benefits
10.3 Solving the problem: Private bargaining and property rights
10.4 Solving the problem: Regulation, taxation, and compensation
10.5 External effects: More examples and diagnoses
10.6 Public goods, non-rivalry, and excludability: A model of radio broadcasting
10.7 Public goods and bads, open access, and shared resources
10.8 Asymmetric information: Principal–agent relationships, hidden actions, and incomplete contracts
10.9 Hidden actions and risk: Market failure in insurance and credit markets
10.10 Asymmetric information: Hidden attributes and adverse selection
10.11 The limits of markets
10.12 Summary
10.13 References

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