The Economics of Contracts 2nd Edition by Bernard Salanie 0262534223 9780262534222

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• ISBN 10:0262534223 

• ISBN 13:9780262534222

• Author:Bernard Salanie 

 A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition.

The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own.

The Economics of Contracts 2nd Table of contents:

Foreword to the Second Edition     
Foreword to the First Edition     
Introduction     
The Great Families of Models     
The Principal-Agent Model     
Overview of the Book    
References     
Adverse Selection: General Theory     
Mechanism Design     
General Mechanisms     
Application to Adverse Selection Models     
A Discrete Model of Price Discrimination     
The Consumer     
The Seller     
The First-Best: Perfect Discrimination     
Imperfect Information     
The Standard Model    
Analysis of the Incentive Constraints     
Solving the Model     
Exercises     
References     
Adverse Selection: Examples and Extensions     
Examples of Applications     
Regulating a Firm     
Optimal Taxation     
The Insurer as a Monopolist     
Extensions     
Perfect Competition in Contracts     
Multiple Principals     
The Theory ofAuctions     
Collusion     
Risk-Averse Agents     
Multidimensional Characteristics     
Bilateral Private Information     
Type-Dependent Reservation Utilities    
Auditing the Agent     
Exercises     
References     
Signaling Models     
The Market for Secondhand Cars     
Costly Signals     
Separating Equilibria     
Pooling Equilibria     
The Selection of an Equilibrium     
Costless Signals     
A Simple Example     
The General Model     
Other Examples     
The Informed Principal     
Exercises     
References     
Moral Hazard     
A Simple Example     
The Standard Model     
The Agent’s Program     
The Principal’s Program     
Properties of the Optimal Contract     
Extensions     
Informativeness and Second-Best Loss     
A Continuum of Actions      
The Limited Liability Model     
An Infinity of Outcomes     
The Multisignal Case     
Imperfect Performance Measurement     
Models with Several Agents     
Models with Several Principals     
The Robustness of Contracts     
The Multitask Model     
Examples of Applications     
Insurance     
Wage Determination     
Exercises     
References     
The Dynamics of Complete Contracts     
Commitment and Renegotiation     
Strategic Commitment     
Adverse Selection     
Full Commitment     
Long-Term Commitment     
No Commitment     
Short-Term Commitment     
Conclusion     
Moral Hazard     
Renegotiation after Effort     
Convergence to the First-Best     
Finitely Repeated Moral Hazard     
References     
Incomplete Contracts     
Property Rights, Holdup, and Underinvestment     
The Buyer-Seller Model     
The Complete Contract     
Incomplete Contracts and Property Rights     
The Irrelevance Theorems     
Restoring Efficient Investment Incentives     
Using Mechanism Design     
Concluding Remarks     
References     
Some Empirical Work     
Dealing with Unobserved Heterogeneity     
Auctions     
Tests of Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets     
References     
Some Noncooperative Game Theory     
Games of Perfect Information     
Nash Equilibrium     
Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium     
Games of Incomplete Information     
Bayesian Equilibrium     
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium     
Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium     
References     
Name Index     
Subject Index     

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