Economics of Regulation and Antitrust 4th Edition by W Kip Viscusi, John M Vernon, Joseph E Harrington – Ebook PDF Instant Download/Delivery: 026222075X ,9780262220750
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ISBN 10: 026222075X
ISBN 13: 9780262220750
Author: W Kip Viscusi, John M Vernon, Joseph E Harrington
Economics of Regulation and Antitrust 4th Edition Table of contents:
1 (p1): 1 Introduction
2 (p1-1): The Rationale for Regulation and Antitrust Policies
3 (p1-2): Antitrust Regulation
4 (p1-2-1): The Changing Character of Antitrust Issues
5 (p1-2-2): Reasoning behind Antitrust Regulations
5 (p1-3): Economic Regulation
6 (p1-3-1): Development of Economic Regulation
6 (p1-3-2): Factors in Setting Rate Regulations
8 (p1-4): Health，Safety，and Environmental Regulation
9 (p1-4-1): Role of the Courts
9 (p1-5): Criteria for Assessment
11 (p1-6): Questions and Problems
11 (p1-7): Recommended Reading
11 (p1-8): Appendix
13 (p2): 2 The Making of a Regulation
14 (p2-1): State versus Federal Regulation：The Federalism Debate
15 (p2-1-1): Advantages of Federalism
16 (p2-1-2): Advantages of National Regulations
17 (p2-1-3): Product Labeling Example
18 (p2-1-4): The Overlap of State and Federal Regulations
19 (p2-2): The Character of the Rulemaking Process
19 (p2-2-1): The Chronology of New Regulations
24 (p2-3): Nature of the Regulatory Oversight Process
24 (p2-3-1): The Nixon and Ford Administrations
25 (p2-3-2): The Carter Administration
27 (p2-3-3): The Reagan Administration
28 (p2-3-4): The Bush Administration
28 (p2-3-5): The Clinton Administration
28 (p2-3-6): The George W.Bush Administration
28 (p2-3-7): Regulatory Reform Legislation
30 (p2-3-8): Benefit-Cost Analysis
33 (p2-3-9): Discounting Deferred Effects
34 (p2-3-10): Present Value
36 (p2-4): The Criteria Applied in the Oversight Process
36 (p2-4-1): Regulatory Success Stories
37 (p2-4-2): Promotion of Cost-Effective Regulation
38 (p2-4-3): Distortion of Benefit and Cost Estimates
39 (p2-4-4): The Regulatory Role of Price and Quality
39 (p2-5): The Impact of the Oversight Process
40 (p2-5-1): The Cost of Regulation
40 (p2-5-2): Other Measures of the Size of Regulation
45 (p2-5-3): The Character of Regulatory Oversight Actions
48 (p2-6): What Do Regulators Maximize？
48 (p2-6-1): The Capture Theory
49 (p2-6-2): Other Theoryes of Influence Patterns
49 (p2-6-3): Comprehensive Models of Regulatory Objectives
51 (p2-7): Conclusion
51 (p2-8): Questions and Problems
52 (p2-9): Appendix：Trends in Regulatory Agency Budgets and Staff
59 (p3): Ⅰ ANTITRUST
61 (p3-1): 3 Introduction to Antitrust
62 (p3-1-1): Industrial Organization
63 (p3-1-1-1): Structure
66 (p3-1-1-2): Conduct
66 (p3-1-1-3): Performance
68 (p3-1-1-4): Government
69 (p3-1-2): Antitrust
69 (p3-1-2-1): Federal Antitrust Laws
71 (p3-1-2-2): Enforcement and Remedies
75 (p3-1-2-3): Exemptions from Antitrust
76 (p3-1-3): Summary and Overview of Part Ⅰ
76 (p3-1-4): Appendix：Antitrust Statutes
76 (p3-1-4-1): Sherman Act
77 (p3-1-4-2): Clayton Act
78 (p3-1-4-3): Federal Trade Commission Act
79 (p3-2): 4 Efficiency and Technical Progress
79 (p3-2-1): Economic Efficiency
80 (p3-2-1-1): Partial Equilibrium Welfare Tools
82 (p3-2-1-2): Monopoly-versus-Competition Example
84 (p3-2-1-3): Oil Industry Application
85 (p3-2-1-4): Some Complications
88 (p3-2-1-5): X-Inefficiency
89 (p3-2-1-6): Monopoly-Induced Waste
90 (p3-2-1-7): Estimates of the Welfare Loss from Monopoly
93 (p3-2-2): Technical Progress
93 (p3-2-2-1): Importance of Technological Change
95 (p3-2-2-2): A Model of R ＆ D Rivalry
98 (p3-2-3): Summary
99 (p3-2-4): Questions and Problems
101 (p3-3): 5 Oligopoly，Collusion，and Antitrust
101 (p3-3-1): Game Theory
101 (p3-3-1-1): Example 1：Advertising Competition
103 (p3-3-1-2): Example 2：Compatibility of Standards
104 (p3-3-1-3): The Strategic Form of a Game
105 (p3-3-1-4): Nash Equilibrium
106 (p3-3-2): Oligopoly Theory
106 (p3-3-2-1): The Cournot Solution
112 (p3-3-2-2): Other Models of Oligopoly
113 (p3-3-2-3): Product Differentiation
116 (p3-3-3): Collusion
117 (p3-3-3-1): A Theory of Collusion
121 (p3-3-3-2): Challenges to Collusion
128 (p3-3-3-3): Collusion in Practice
134 (p3-3-4): Antitrust Law and Policy toward Price Fixing
135 (p3-3-4-1): Economic Analysis of Legal Categories
137 (p3-3-4-2): Per Se Rule Cases
140 (p3-3-4-3): Tacit Collusion
144 (p3-3-4-4): Enforcement Policy
150 (p3-3-5): Summary
151 (p3-3-6): Questions and Problems
153 (p3-3-7): Appendix
153 (p3-3-7-1): Game Theory：Formal Definitions
155 (p3-4): 6 Market Structure and Strategic Competition
155 (p3-4-1): Market Structure
155 (p3-4-1-1): Concentration
162 (p3-4-1-2): Scale Economies
164 (p3-4-1-3): Entry Conditions
174 (p3-4-2): Dominant Firm Theory
174 (p3-4-2-1): Static Analysis
177 (p3-4-2-2): Dynamic Analysis：Limit Pricing
182 (p3-4-3): Strategic Competition
183 (p3-4-3-1): Limit Pricing
190 (p3-4-3-2): Investment in Cost-Reducing Capital
194 (p3-4-3-3): Raising Rivals’ Costs
194 (p3-4-4): Preemption and Brand Proliferation
198 (p3-4-5): Summary
198 (p3-4-6): Questions and Problems
203 (p3-5): 7 Mergers
204 (p3-5-1): Antitrust Laws and Merger Trends
207 (p3-5-2): Reasons for Mergers
207 (p3-5-2-1): Monopoly
207 (p3-5-2-2): Economies
208 (p3-5-2-3): Reducing Management Inefficiencies
210 (p3-5-3): Horizontal Mergers
210 (p3-5-3-1): Benefits and Costs
219 (p3-5-3-2): Effects of Airline Mergers
220 (p3-5-3-3): Cases
225 (p3-5-3-4): U.S.Department of Justice Merger Guidelines
229 (p3-5-4): Conglomerate Mergers
229 (p3-5-4-1): Potential Benefits
230 (p3-5-4-2): Anticompetitive Effects and Cases
232 (p3-5-5): Summary
233 (p3-5-6): Questions and Problems
235 (p3-6): 8 Vertical Mergers and Vertical Restraints
236 (p3-6-1): Vertical Mergers
237 (p3-6-1-1): Benefits
241 (p3-6-1-2): Anticompetitive Effects
246 (p3-6-1-3): Commitment and the Restoration of Market Power
248 (p3-6-1-4): Raising Rivals’ Costs
253 (p3-6-1-5): Antitrust Law and Policy
254 (p3-6-1-6): Historical Development
255 (p3-6-1-7): Time Warner and Turner
257 (p3-6-2): Vertical Restraints
258 (p3-6-2-1): Exclusive Dealing
263 (p3-6-2-2): Antitrust Law and Policy
266 (p3-6-2-3): Tying
275 (p3-6-2-4): Modern Theories of Leveraging
282 (p3-6-2-5): Manufacturer-Retailer Restraints
288 (p3-6-3): Summary
289 (p3-6-4): Questions and Problems
293 (p3-7): 9 Monopolization and Price Discrimination
294 (p3-7-1): Establishing Monopolization Claims
294 (p3-7-1-1): Measuring Monopoly Power
298 (p3-7-1-2): Assessing Intent to Monopolize
299 (p3-7-2): Development of Antitrust Case Law
299 (p3-7-2-1): 1890-1940：Standard Oil and United States Steel
300 (p3-7-2-2): 1940-1970：Alcoa and United Shoe Machinery
303 (p3-7-2-3): 1970 to Present：Kodak，IBM，Microsoft，and Others
305 (p3-7-3): Predatory Pricing
309 (p3-7-3-1): Theories of Predatory Pricing
316 (p3-7-3-2): Efficiency Rationales
317 (p3-7-3-3): Antitrust Policy
317 (p3-7-3-4): The Areeda-Turner Rule and Other Single-Parameter Rules
319 (p3-7-3-5): The Brooke Case and the Two-Tier Rule
321 (p3-7-3-6): Recent Developments
322 (p3-7-4): Refusal to Deal and the Essential Facilities Doctrine
323 (p3-7-4-1): Essential Facilities Doctrine
324 (p3-7-4-2): Intellectual Property Rights
326 (p3-7-4-3): Kodak and Monopoly Power in Aftermarkets
332 (p3-7-5): Microsoft Case
332 (p3-7-5-1): Network Externalities
336 (p3-7-5-2): Antitrust Case
338 (p3-7-5-3): Tying and Monopolization of the Browser Market
339 (p3-7-5-4): Maintenance of Monopoly in the Operating Systems Market
342 (p3-7-5-5): Remedies and Harm
343 (p3-7-6): Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act
344 (p3-7-6-1): Systematic Discrimination
349 (p3-7-6-2): Unsystematic Discrimination
350 (p3-7-6-3): Cases
352 (p3-7-7): Summary
352 (p3-7-8): Questions and Problems
355 (p4): Ⅱ ECONOMIC REGULATION
357 (p4-1): 10 Introduction to Economic Regulation
357 (p4-1-1): What Is Economic Regulation？
358 (p4-1-2): Instruments of Regulation
358 (p4-1-2-1): Control of Price
359 (p4-1-2-2): Control of Quantity
359 (p4-1-2-3): Control of Entry and Exit
360 (p4-1-2-4): Control of Other Variables
362 (p4-1-3): Brief History of Economic Regulation
362 (p4-1-3-1): Formative Stages
364 (p4-1-3-2): Trends in Regulation
369 (p4-1-4): The Regulatory Process
369 (p4-1-4-1): Overview of the Regulatory Process
371 (p4-1-4-2): Regulatory Legislation
371 (p4-1-4-3): Independent Regulatory Commissions
373 (p4-1-4-4): Regulatory Procedures
375 (p4-1-5): The Theory of Regulation
376 (p4-1-5-1): Normative Analysis as a Positive Theory
379 (p4-1-5-2): Capture Theory
380 (p4-1-5-3): Economic Theory of Regulation
392 (p4-1-5-4): Testing Theoryes of Regulation
396 (p4-1-6): Summary and Overview of Part Ⅱ
397 (p4-1-7): Appendix
397 (p4-1-7-1): A Theory of Interest Group Competition
399 (p4-1-8): Questions and Problems
401 (p4-2): 11 Theory of Natural Monopoly
401 (p4-2-1): The Natural Monopoly Problem
402 (p4-2-1-1): Permanent and Temporary Natural Monopoly
404 (p4-2-1-2): Subadditivity and Multiproduct Monopoly
408 (p4-2-2): Alternative Policy Solutions
409 (p4-2-2-1): Ideal Pricing
421 (p4-2-2-2): Franchise Bidding
421 (p4-2-2-3): Actual Solutions
423 (p4-2-3): Summary
423 (p4-2-4): Appendix
423 (p4-2-4-1): The Troublesome Case of a Natural Monopoly
425 (p4-2-5): Questions and Problems
429 (p4-3): 12 Natural Monopoly Regulation and Electric Power
430 (p4-3-1): Traditional Rate-of-Return Regulation
431 (p4-3-1-1): The Rate Case
433 (p4-3-1-2): Averch-Johnson Effect
436 (p4-3-2): Incentive Regulation
436 (p4-3-2-1): Performance Standards
437 (p4-3-2-2): Earnings Sharings
439 (p4-3-2-3): Price Caps
442 (p4-3-2-4): Yardstick Regulation
443 (p4-3-3): Rate Structure
443 (p4-3-3-1): FDC Pricing
445 (p4-3-3-2): Undue Discrimination
447 (p4-3-4): Peak-Load Pricing
447 (p4-3-4-1): Costs of Power Production
449 (p4-3-4-2): Peak-Load Pricing Model
453 (p4-3-5): Regulation and Restructuring of Electric Power
453 (p4-3-5-1): Historical，Technological，and Regulatory Background
455 (p4-3-5-2): Overview of Recent Legislation
456 (p4-3-5-3): Restructuring in California
461 (p4-3-6): Summary
462 (p4-3-7): Questions and Problems
465 (p4-4): 13 Franchise Bidding and Cable Television
465 (p4-4-1): Theory of Franchise Bidding
467 (p4-4-1-1): Competition at the Bidding Stage
475 (p4-4-1-2): Contractual Arrangements for the Postbidding Stage
478 (p4-4-1-3): Assessment of Franchise Bidding
479 (p4-4-2): Cable Television
480 (p4-4-2-1): Historical/Regulatory Background
481 (p4-4-2-2): Cable Television as a Natural Monopoly
485 (p4-4-2-3): Franchising Process
487 (p4-4-2-4): Assessment of Franchise Bidding
492 (p4-4-2-5): Rate Regulation
497 (p4-4-2-6): Is There a Role for Government Intervention？
499 (p4-4-3): Summary
500 (p4-4-4): Questions and Problems
503 (p4-5): 14 Public Enterprise
504 (p4-5-1): General Background
505 (p4-5-2): Positive Theory of Public Enterprise
506 (p4-5-2-1): Managerial Model of a Firm
507 (p4-5-2-2): Managerial Model of a Private Enterprise
508 (p4-5-2-3): Managerial Model of a Public Enterprise
510 (p4-5-2-4): Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise
512 (p4-5-3): Municipal Electric Utilities
512 (p4-5-3-1): Pricing Behavior
513 (p4-5-3-2): Allocative Efficiency Comparison
515 (p4-5-3-3): Productive Efficiency Comparison
515 (p4-5-3-4): Assessment of Private versus Public Utilities
516 (p4-5-4): Airlines
517 (p4-5-5): Privatization
521 (p4-5-6): Summary
522 (p4-5-7): Questions and Problems
523 (p4-6): 15 Dynamic Issues in Natural Monopoly Regulation：Telecommunications
523 (p4-6-1): Transformation of a Natural Monopoly
524 (p4-6-1-1): Basis for Natural Monopoly Regulation
527 (p4-6-1-2): Sources of Natural Monopoly Transformation
529 (p4-6-1-3): Regulatory Response
534 (p4-6-1-4): Intercity Telecommunications Market
544 (p4-6-2): Telecommunications Act of 1996
546 (p4-6-3): Separation of Regulated Monopolies and Competitive Markets
547 (p4-6-3-1): Benefits and Costs of Separation
550 (p4-6-3-2): Breakup of AT＆T
551 (p4-6-4): Summary
553 (p4-6-5): Questions and Problems
555 (p4-7): 16 The Regulation of Potentially Competitive Markets：Theory and Estimation Methods
556 (p4-7-1): Theory of Price and Entry/Exit Regulation
556 (p4-7-1-1): Direct Effects of Price and Entry/Exit Regulation：The Competitive Model
560 (p4-7-1-2): Direct Effects of Price and Entry/Exit Regulation：The Imperfectly Competitive Model
564 (p4-7-1-3): Indirect Effects of Price and Entry Regulation
567 (p4-7-1-4): Some Indirect Effects of Price and Exit Regulation
568 (p4-7-1-5): Regulation and Innovation
572 (p4-7-2): Methods for Estimating the Effects of Regulation
572 (p4-7-2-1): Overview of Estimation Methods
572 (p4-7-2-2): Intertemporal Approach
574 (p4-7-2-3): Application：New York Stock Exchange
575 (p4-7-2-4): Intermarket Approach
576 (p4-7-2-5): Application：Advertising of Eyeglasses
578 (p4-7-2-6): Application：44 Liquormart Decision
578 (p4-7-2-7): Counterfactual Approach
579 (p4-7-2-8): Application：State Usury Laws
583 (p4-7-3): Measuring the Return to Price and Entry Restrictions：Taxicab Regulation
585 (p4-7-4): Summary
587 (p4-7-5): Questions and Problems
589 (p4-8): 17 Economic Regulation of Transportation：Surface Freight and Airlines
589 (p4-8-1): Transportation Industry
591 (p4-8-2): Surface Freight Transportation
591 (p4-8-2-1): Regulatory History
595 (p4-8-2-2): Description of Regulatory Practices
597 (p4-8-2-3): Effects of Regulation
609 (p4-8-3): Airlines
609 (p4-8-3-1): Regulatory History
611 (p4-8-3-2): Description of Regulatory Practices
612 (p4-8-3-3): Effects of Regulation
625 (p4-8-3-4): Competition and Antitrust Policy after Deregulation
638 (p4-8-3-5): Lessons from Regulation and Deregulation
639 (p4-8-4): Summary
640 (p4-8-5): Questions and Problems
641 (p4-9): 18 Economic Regulation of Energy：Crude Oil and Natural Gas
642 (p4-9-1): The Theory of Price Ceilings
646 (p4-9-2): Price and Quantity Regulation of the Crude Oil Industry
648 (p4-9-2-1): Regulatory History
651 (p4-9-3): Oil Prorationing
651 (p4-9-3-1): Regulatory Practices
651 (p4-9-3-2): Rationale for Prorationing
656 (p4-9-3-3): Solutions to the Common Pool Problem
657 (p4-9-3-4): Effects of Prorationing
659 (p4-9-4): Mandatory Oil Import Program
659 (p4-9-4-1): Regulatory Practices
659 (p4-9-4-2): Effects of Regulation
661 (p4-9-5): Crude Oil Price Controls
661 (p4-9-5-1): Regulatory Practices
663 (p4-9-5-2): Effects of Price Regulation
671 (p4-9-6): Price Regulation of the Natural Gas Industry
672 (p4-9-6-1): Regulatory History
673 (p4-9-6-2): Regulatory Practices
675 (p4-9-6-3): Effects of Price Regulation
683 (p4-9-6-4): Transition from Regulation to Markets in the Transmission of Natural Gas
685 (p4-9-7): Summary
686 (p4-9-8): Questions and Problems
689 (p5): Ⅲ HEALTH，SAFETY，AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
691 (p5-1): 19 Introduction：The Emergence of Health，Safety，and Environmental Regulation
692 (p5-1-1): Risk in Perspective
694 (p5-1-1-1): Measuring Mortality Risks
695 (p5-1-2): The Infeasibility of a No-Risk Society
696 (p5-1-2-1): Homeland Security
699 (p5-1-2-2): Wealth and Risk
700 (p5-1-2-3): Irrationality and Biases in Risk Perception
703 (p5-1-3): Policy Evaluation
704 (p5-1-3-1): Regulatory Standards
704 (p5-1-3-2): Benefit-Cost Analysis
705 (p5-1-3-3): The Role of Heterogeneity
707 (p5-1-4): Uncertainty and Conservatism
707 (p5-1-4-1): The Role of Risk Ambiguity
709 (p5-1-5): The Role of Political Factors
709 (p5-1-5-1): Economic Models of Environmental Policies
711 (p5-1-5-2): Voting Patterns
713 (p5-1-6): Summary and Overview of Part Ⅲ
714 (p5-1-7): Questions and Problems
715 (p5-1-8): Recommended Reading
717 (p5-2): 20 Valuing Life and Other Nonmonetary Benefits
718 (p5-2-1): Policy Evaluation Principles
720 (p5-2-2): Willingness-to-Pay versus Other Approaches
723 (p5-2-3): Variations in the Value of Statistical Life
725 (p5-2-4): The Labor Market Model
730 (p5-2-5): Empirical Estimates of the Value of Life
731 (p5-2-6): Value of Risks to Life for Regulatory Policies
736 (p5-2-7): Survey Approaches to Valuing Policy Effects
738 (p5-2-7-1): Valuation of Air Quality
738 (p5-2-7-2): Exploratory Nature of the Survey Approach
739 (p5-2-8): Sensitivity Analysis and Cost-Effectiveness
740 (p5-2-9): Risk-Risk Analysis
742 (p5-2-10): Establishing Prices for Health，Safety，and Environmental Regulation
742 (p5-2-11): Questions and Problems
745 (p5-3): 21 Environmental Regulation
746 (p5-3-1): The Coase Theorem for Externalities
747 (p5-3-1-1): The Coase Theorem as a Bargaining Game
748 (p5-3-1-2): A Pollution Example
750 (p5-3-1-3): Long-Run Efficiency Concerns
750 (p5-3-1-4): Transaction Costs and Other Problems
751 (p5-3-1-5): Smoking Externalities
754 (p5-3-1-6): Special Features of Environmental Contexts
756 (p5-3-1-7): Siting Nuclear Wastes
757 (p5-3-2): Selecting the Optimal Policy：Standards versus Fines
758 (p5-3-2-1): Setting the Pollution Tax
760 (p5-3-2-2): The Role of Heterogeneity
761 (p5-3-2-3): The Role of Uncertainty
763 (p5-3-2-4): Pollution Taxes
764 (p5-3-2-5): Cost Heterogeneity for Water Pollution Control
765 (p5-3-3): Current Market Trading Policies
768 (p5-3-3-1): The Future of Market Approaches
769 (p5-3-4): Global Warming and Irreversible Environmental Effects
769 (p5-3-4-1): Assessing the Merits of Global Warming Policies
771 (p5-3-4-2): How Should We React to Uncertainty？
772 (p5-3-5): Multiperson Decisions and Group Externalities
772 (p5-3-5-1): The Prisoner’s Dilemma
773 (p5-3-5-2): The N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma
774 (p5-3-5-3): Applications of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
775 (p5-3-6): The Enforcement and Performance of Environmental Regulation
775 (p5-3-6-1): Enforcement Options and Consequences
776 (p5-3-6-2): Hazardous Wastes
779 (p5-3-6-3): Contingent Valuation for the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
782 (p5-3-6-4): The Senior Discount for the Value of Life
783 (p5-3-6-5): Evaluating Performance
785 (p5-3-7): Summary
786 (p5-3-8): Questions and Problems
789 (p5-4): 22 Product Safety
789 (p5-4-1): Emergence of Product Safety Regulations
790 (p5-4-2): Current Safety Decisions
792 (p5-4-3): Changing Emphasis of Product Regulation
793 (p5-4-4): Premanufacturing Screening：The Case of Pharmaceuticals
794 (p5-4-4-1): Weighing the Significance of Side Effects
794 (p5-4-4-2): Drug Approval Strategies
798 (p5-4-5): The Behavioral Response to Product Safety Regulation
801 (p5-4-5-1): Consumer’s Potential for Muting Safety Device Benefits
804 (p5-4-6): The Costs of Product Safety Regulation：The Automobile Industry Case
808 (p5-4-7): Trends in Motor Vehicle and Home Accident Deaths
809 (p5-4-7-1): Accident Rate Influences
809 (p5-4-7-2): The Decline of Accident Rates
810 (p5-4-8): The Rise of Product Liability
812 (p5-4-8-1): The Negligence Standard
813 (p5-4-8-2): The Strict Liability Standard
813 (p5-4-8-3): The Ford Pinto Case
815 (p5-4-8-4): Escalation of Damages
816 (p5-4-9): Risk Information and Hazard Warnings
817 (p5-4-9-1): Self-Certification of Safe Products
818 (p5-4-9-2): Government Determination of Safety
818 (p5-4-10): Alternatives to Direct Command and Control Regulation
820 (p5-4-11): Regulation through Litigation
821 (p5-4-11-1): Breast Implant Litigation and Regulation
823 (p5-4-12): The Future of Product Safety Policy
825 (p5-4-13): Questions and Problems
827 (p5-5): 23 Regulation of Workplace Health and Safety
829 (p5-5-1): The Potential for Inefficiencies
829 (p5-5-2): How Markets Can Promote Safety
831 (p5-5-3): Compensating Wage Differential Theory
833 (p5-5-4): Risk Information
835 (p5-5-5): On-the-Job Experience and Worker Quit Rates
836 (p5-5-6): Inadequacies in the Market
838 (p5-5-6-1): Externalities
838 (p5-5-7): OSHA’s Regulatory Approach
839 (p5-5-7-1): Setting OSHA Standard Levels
841 (p5-5-7-2): The Nature of OSHA Standards
843 (p5-5-7-3): The Reform of OSHA Standards
843 (p5-5-7-4): Regulatory Reform Initiatives
843 (p5-5-7-5): Changes in OSHA Standards
847 (p5-5-7-6): OSHA’s Enforcement Strategy
848 (p5-5-7-7): Inspection Policies
849 (p5-5-7-8): Trivial Violations
849 (p5-5-7-9): OSHA Penalties
850 (p5-5-7-10): Enforcement Targeting
851 (p5-5-8): The Impact of OSHA Enforcement on Worker Safety
852 (p5-5-8-1): OSHA Regulations in Different Situations
854 (p5-5-8-2): OSHA and Other Factors Affecting Injuries
860 (p5-5-9): The Role of Workers’ Compensation
861 (p5-5-10): Agenda for Policy Reform Efforts
863 (p5-5-11): Questions and Problems
865 (p5-6): 24 Patents and Pharmaceuticals
865 (p5-6-1): Economics of Invention and Patents
867 (p5-6-1-1): Background on Patents
868 (p5-6-1-2): Incentives to Invent：Monopoly versus Competition
872 (p5-6-1-3): Welfare Analysis of Patents
881 (p5-6-2): Pharmaceuticals and the Role of Patents
881 (p5-6-2-1): Industry Structure
891 (p5-6-2-2): The 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act
894 (p5-6-2-3): Other Policies That Affect R＆D Incentives
899 (p5-6-3): Summary
899 (p5-6-4): Questions and Problems
903 (p6): Author Index
909 (p7): Subject Index
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Tags: W Kip Viscusi, John M Vernon, Joseph E Harrington, Regulation, Antitrust, Economics