The Microeconomics of Public Policy Analysis 1st edition by Lee Friedman 1400885701 9781400885701

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ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎1400885701 

ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 9781400885701

Author: Lee Friedman

This book shows, from start to finish, how microeconomics can and should be used in the analysis of public policy problems. It is an exciting new way to learn microeconomics, motivated by its application to important, real-world issues. Lee Friedman’s modern replacement for his influential 1984 work not only brings the issues addressed into the present but develops all intermediate microeconomic theory to make this book accessible to a much wider audience. Friedman offers the microeconomic tools necessary to understand policy analysis of a wide range of matters of public concern–including the recent California electricity crisis, welfare reform, public school finance, global warming, health insurance, day care, tax policies, college loans, and mass transit pricing.

The Microeconomics of Public Policy Analysis 1st Table of contents:

PART ONE MICROECONOMIC MODELS FOR PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS
Chapter 1 Introduction to Microeconomic Policy Analysis
Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation
The Diverse Economic Activities of Governments
Policy-Making and the Roles of Microeconomic Policy Analysis
Organization of the Book
Conclusion
Chapter 2 An Introduction to Modeling: Demand, Supply, and Benefit-Cost Reasoning
Modeling: A Basic Tool of Microeconomic Policy Analysis
Demand, Supply, and Benefit-Cost Reasoning
Monday Morning, 6:45 A.M.
Monday Morning, 9:00 A.M.
Summary
Discussion Questions
Chapter 3 Utility Maximization, Efficiency, and Equity
A Model of Individual Resource Allocation
Efficiency
The General Concept
Efficiency with an Individualistic Interpretation
Efficiency in a Model of an Exchange Economy
A Geometric Representation of the Model
Relative Efficiency
Equity
Equality of Outcome Is One Concept of Equity
Equality of Opportunity Is Another Concept of Equity
Integrating Equity-Efficiency Evaluation in a Social Welfare Function^S
Summary
Exercises
Appendix: Calculus Models of Consumer Exchange^O
PART TWO USING MODELS OF INDIVIDUAL CHOICE-MAKING IN POLICY ANALYSIS
Chapter 4 The Specification of Individual Choice Models for the Analysis of Welfare Programs
Standard Argument: In-Kind Welfare Transfers Are Inefficient
Responses to Income and Price Changes
Response to Income Changes
Response to Changes in a Good’s Price
Response to Price Changes of Related Goods
Choice Restrictions Imposed by Policy
Food Stamp Choice Restriction: The Maximum Allotment
Food Stamp Choice Restriction: The Resale Prohibition
Public Housing Choice Restrictions^S
Income Maintenance and Work Efforts
The Labor-Leisure Choice
Work Disincentives of Current Welfare Programs
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
Interdependent Preference Arguments: In-Kind Transfers May Be Efficient^S
Summary
Exercises
Appendix: The Mathematics of Income and Substitution Effects^O
Chapter 5 The Analysis of Equity Standards: An Intergovernmental Grant Application
Equity Objectives
Intergovernmental Grants
Design Features of a Grant Program
Income Effects and Nonmatching Grants
Price Effects and Matching Grants
The Role of Choice Restrictions
Alternative Specifications of Recipient Choice-Making
Equity in School Finance
The Equity Defects Identified in Serrano
The Design of Wealth-Neutral Systems
Other Issues of School Finance Equity
Summary
Exercises
Appendix: An Exercise in the Use of a Social Welfare Function as an Aid in Evaluating School Finance
Chapter 6 The Compensation Principle of Benefit-Cost Reasoning: Benefit Measures and Market Demands
The Compensation Principle of Relative Efficiency
The Purpose of a Relative Efficiency Standard
The Hicks-Kaldor Compensation Principle
Controversy over the Use of the Compensation Principle
Measuring Benefits and Costs: Market Statistics and Consumer Surplus
An Illustrative Application: Model Specification for Consumer Protection Legislation^S
Problems with Measuring Individual Benefit^S
Three Measures of Individual Welfare Change
Empirical Evidence: Large Differences among the Measures
Summary
Exercises
Appendix: Duality, the Cobb-Douglas Expenditure Function, and Measures of Individual Welfare^O
Chapter 7 Uncertainty and Public Policy
Expected Value and Expected Utility
Risk Control and Risk-Shifting Mechanisms
Risk-Pooling and Risk-Spreading
Policy Aspects of Risk-Shifting and Risk Control
Alternative Models of Individual Behavior under Uncertainty
The Slumlord’s Dilemma and Strategic Behavior
Bounded Rationality
Moral Hazard and Medical Care Insurance
Information Asymmetry and Hidden Action: The Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s and Involuntary Un
Summary
Exercises
Appendix: Evaluating the Costs of Uncertainty
Chapter 8 Allocation over Time and Indexation
Intertemporal Allocation and Capital Markets
Individual Consumption Choice with Savings Opportunities
Individual Consumption Choice with Borrowing and Savings Opportunities
Individual Investment and Consumption Choices
The Demand and Supply of Resources for Investment
Individual Choices in Multiperiod Models
Choosing a Discount Rate
Uncertain Future Prices and Index Construction
Summary
Exercises
Appendix: Discounting over Continuous Intervals^O
PART THREE POLICY ASPECTS OF PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY DECISIONS
Chapter 9 The Cost Side of Policy Analysis: Technical Limits, Productive Possibilities, and Cost Con
Technical Possibilities and the Production Function
The Production Function Is a Summary of Technological Possibilities
Efficiency, Not Productivity, Is the Objective
Characterizing Different Production Functions
Costs
Social Opportunity Cost and Benefit-Cost Analysis
Accounting Cost and Private Opportunity Cost
An Application in a Benefit-Cost Analysis
Cost-Output Relations
Joint Costs and Peak-Load Pricing^S
Summary
Exercises
Appendix: Duality—Some Mathematical Relations between Production and Cost Functions^O
Chapter 10 Private Profit-Making Organizations: Objectives, Capabilities, and Policy Implications
The Concept of a Firm
The Private Profit-Maximizing Firm
Profit Maximization Requires that Marginal Revenue Equal Marginal Cost
The Profit-Maximizing Monopolist
Types of Monopolistic Price Discrimination
Normative Consequences of Price Discrimination
The Robinson-Patman Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act
Predicting Price Discrimination
Alternative Models of Organizational Objectives and Capabilities^S
Objectives Other than Profit Maximization
Limited Maximization Capabilities
Summary
Exercises
Chapter 11 Public and Nonprofit Organizations: Objectives, Capabilities, and Policy Implications
Nonprofit Organizations: Models of Hospital Resource Allocation
Public Bureaus and Enterprises
Empirical Prediction of Public Enterprise Behavior: The Pricing Decisions of BART
A Normative Model of Public Enterprise Pricing: The Efficient Fare Structure
Summary
Exercises
Apppendix: The Mathematics of Ramsey Pricing^O
PART FOUR COMPETITIVE MARKETS AND PUBLIC POLICY INTERVENTIONS
Chapter 12 Efficiency, Distribution, and General Competitive Analysis: Consequences of Taxation
Economic Efficiency and General Competitive Equilibrium
Efficiency in an Economy with Production
Competitive Equilibrium in One Industry
The Twin Theorems Relating Competition and Efficiency
General Competitive Analysis and Efficiency
Partial Equilibrium Analysis: The Excise Tax
General Equilibrium Analysis: Perfect Competition and the Excise Tax
Lump-Sum Taxes Are Efficient and Most Real Taxes Are Inefficient
Summary
Exercises
Appendix: Derivation of the Competitive General Equilibrium Model
Chapter 13 The Control of Prices to Achieve Equity in Specific Markets
Price Support for Agriculture
Apartment Rent Control
Preview: Economic Justice and Economic Rent
Dissatisfaction with Market Pricing during Temporary Shortage of a Necessity
A Standard Explanation of the Inefficiency of Rent Control
Rent Control as the Control of Long-Run Economic Rent
The Relation between Rent Control and Capitalized Property Values
The Supply Responses to Rent Control
The Effects of Rent Control on Apartment Exchange
Recent Issues of Rent Control
A Windfall Profits Tax as Rent Control
Summary
Exercises
Chapter 14 Distributional Control with Rations and Vouchers
Ration Coupons
Vouchers and Ration-Vouchers
Rationing Military Service
The Utility Value of Work
Conscription versus the All-Volunteer Military
Income Effects of Rationing Methods^S
Rationing Gasoline during a Shortage
Other Rationing Policies
Summary
Exercises
PART FIVE SOURCES OF MARKET FAILURE AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
Chapter 15 Allocative Difficulties in Markets and Governments
Market Failures
Limited Competition Owing to Scale and Scope Economies over the Relevant Range of Demand
Public Goods
Externalities
Imperfect Information
Second-Best Failures
Government Failures
Direct Democracy
Representative Democracy
Public Producers
Summary
Exercises
Chapter 16 The Problem of Public Goods
The Efficient Level of a Public Good
The Problem of Demand Revelation
The Housing Survey Example
Mechanisms of Demand Revelation
The Public Television Example
Summary
Exercises
Chapter 17 Externalities and Policies to Internalize Them
A Standard Critique of Air Pollution Control Efforts
The Coase Theorem
Efficient Organizational Design and the Degree of Centralized Decision-Making
Reconsidering Methods for the Control of Air Pollution
Summary
Exercise
Chapter 18 Industry Regulation
Oligopoly and Natural Monopoly
Rate-of-Return Regulation
Franchise Bidding: The Case of Cable Television
Incentive Regulation
Summary
Exercise
Chapter 19 Policy Problems of Allocating Resources over Time
Perfectly Competitive and Actual Capital Markets
The Social Rate of Discount
Education as a Capital Investment
The Market Failures in Financing Higher Education Investments
Income-Contingent Loan Plans for Financing Higher Education
The Allocation of Natural Resources
Renewable Resources: Tree Models
A Note on Investment Time and Interest Rates: Switching and Reswitching
The Allocation of Exhaustible Resources Such as Oil
Summary
Exercises
Chapter 20 Imperfect Information and Institutional Choices
Asymmetric Information
Adverse Selection, Market Signals, and Discrimination in the Labor Market
Moral Hazard and Contracting
The Nonprofit Supplier as a Response to Moral Hazard
Nonprofit Organizations and the Delivery of Day-Care Services
The Value of Trust

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