Public Choice III 3rd Edition by Dennis Mueller – Ebook PDF Instant Download/Delivery: 0521894751 , 978-0521894753
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ISBN 10: 0521894751
ISBN 13: 978-0521894753
Author: Dennis Mueller
This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined. The book is suitable for upper level courses in economics dealing with politics, and political science courses emphasizing rational actor models.
Public Choice III 3rd Table of contents:
CHAPTER 1 Introduction
PART I Origins of the state
CHAPTER 2 The reason for collective choice – allocative efficiency
2.1 Public goods and prisoners’ dilemmas
2.2 Coordination games
2.3 Public goods and chickens
2.4 Voluntary provision of public goods with constant returns to scale
2.5 Voluntary provision of public goods with varying supply technologies
2.6 Externalities
2.7 The Coase theorem
2.8 Coase and the core
2.9 A generalization of the Coase theorem
2.10 Does the Coase theorem hold without predefined property rights?
2.11 Externalities with large numbers of individuals
2.12 Externalities with large numbers of individuals – a second time
2.13 Experimental results in the voluntary provision of public goods
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 3 The reason for collective choice – redistribution
3.1 Redistribution as insurance
3.2 Redistribution as a public good
3.3 Redistribution to satisfy fairness norms
Discussion
3.4 Redistribution to improve allocative efficiency
3.5 Redistribution as taking
3.6 Income transfers in the United States
3.7 Redistribution and the distribution of income
3.8 Redistribution to special interests
Bibliographical notes
PART II Public choice in a direct democracy
CHAPTER 4 The choice of voting rule
4.1 The unanimity rule
4.2 Criticisms of the unanimity rule
4.3 The optimal majority
4.4 A simple majority as the optimal majority
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 5 Majority rule – positive properties
5.1 Majority rule and redistribution
5.2 Cycling
5.3 The median voter theorem – one-dimensional issues
5.4 Majority rule and multidimensional issues
5.5 Proof of the median voter theorem – multidimensional case
5.6 Majority rule equilibria when preferences are not defined in spatial terms
5.7 Proof of extremal restriction – majority rule theorem
5.8 Restrictions on preferences, on the nature and number of issues, and on the choice of voting rul
5.8.1 Preference homogeneity
5.8.2 Homogeneous preferences and qualified majority rules
5.8.3 The relationship between numbers of issues and alternatives and the required majority
5.9 Logrolling
5.10 Logrolling and cycling
5.11 Testing for logrolling
5.12 Agenda manipulation
5.12.1 Agenda control in a spatial environment
5.12.2 Agenda control in a divide-the-cake game
5.13 Why so much stability?
5.13.1 Issues are indeed of one dimension
5.13.2 Voting one dimension at a time
5.13.3 Logrolling equilibria
5.13.4 Empirical evidence of cycling
5.13.5 Experimental evidence of cycling
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 6 Majority rule – normative properties
6.1 Condorcet’s jury theorem
6.2 May’s theorem on majority rule
6.3 Proof of May’s theorem on majority rule
6.4 The Rae-Taylor theorem on majority rule
6.5 Assumptions underlying the unanimity rule
6.6 Assumptions underlying the two rules contrasted
6.7 The consequences of applying the rules to the “wrong” issues
6.7.1 Deciding improvements in allocative efficiency via majority rule
6.7.2 Deciding redistribution by unanimity
6.8 Conclusions
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 7 Simple alternatives to majority rule
7.1 The alternative voting procedures defined
7.2 The procedures compared – Condorcet efficiency
7.3 The procedures compared – utilitarian efficiency
7.4 The Borda count
7.4.1 Axiomatic properties
7.4.2 The Borda count and the “tyranny of the majority”
7.4.3 The Borda count and strategic manipulation
7.5 Approval voting
7.6 Implications for electoral reform
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 8 Complicated alternatives to majority rule
8.1 The demand-revealing process
8.1.1 The mechanics of the process
8.1.2 Vernon Smith’s auction mechanism
8.2 Point voting
8.3 An explication of the Hylland-Zeckhauser point-voting procedure
8.4 Voting by veto
8.5 A comparison of the procedures
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 9 Exit, voice, and disloyalty
9.1 The theory of clubs
9.2 Voting-with-the-feet
9.3 Global optimality via voting-with-the-feet
9.4 Clubs and the core
9.5 Voting-with-the-feet:empirical evidence
9.6 Voluntary association, allocational efficiency, and distributional equity
9.7 The theory of revolution
Bibliographical notes
PART III Public choice in a representative democracy
CHAPTER 10 Federalism
10.1 The logic of federalism
10.1.1 The assignment problem
10.1.2 Federalism with geographic representation
10.2 Why the size of government may be “too large” under federalism
10.2.1 Logrolling
10.2.2 Universalism
10.3 Intergovernmental grants under federalism
10.3.1 Intergovernmental grants to achieve Pareto optimality
10.3.2 The empirical evidence on intergovernmental grants
10.4 Why the size of government may be “too large” and “too small” under federalism
10.5 The problem of centralization under federalism
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 11 Two-party competition – deterministic voting
11.1 Outcomes under two-party democracy
11.2 Two-party competition in a constrained policy space
11.2.1 The uncovered set
11.2.2 The uncovered set with high valence issues
11.3 Relaxing the assumptions of the Downsian model
11.3.1 Candidates have preferences over policies
11.3.2 Candidates can enter and exit the contests
11.4 Testing the median voter hypothesis
11.5 Are local public expenditures public or private goods?
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 12 Two-party competition – probabilistic voting
12.1 Instability with deterministic voting
12.2 Equilibria under probabilistic voting
12.3 Normative characteristics of the equilibria
12.4 Equilibria with interest groups
12.5 An application to taxation
12.5.1 The logic
12.5.2 The evidence
12.6 Commentary
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 13 Multiparty systems
13.1 Two views of representation
13.2 Selecting a representative body of legislators
13.3 Proportional representation in practice
13.4 Electoral rules
13.4.1 The Hare, Droop, Imperiali, d’Hondt, and Sainte-Lagué formulas
13.4.2 The single-transferable vote (STV)
13.4.3 Limited voting
13.4.4 Single-nontransferable-vote systems (SNTV)
13.5 Electoral rules and the number of parties
13.6 Electoral rules and the degree of proportionality
13.7 The goals of parties
13.7.1 Coalition theories with a one-dimensional issue space
13.7.2 Coalition theories with two-or more-dimensional issue spaces
13.8 Cabinet stability
13.8.1 The duration of governments
13.8.2 The death of governments
13.8.3 Summary
13.9 Social stability
13.10 Strategic voting
13.10.1 Strategic voting under the plurality rule
13.10.2 Strategic voting in multiparty systems
13.11 Commentary
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 14 The paradox of voting
14.1 The rational voter hypothesis
14.1.1 Expected utility maximization
14.1.2 A taste for voting
14.1.3 Voting as a game of cat and mouse
14.1.4 The rational voter as minimax-regret strategist
14.2 The rational voter hypothesis: the evidence
14.3 The expressive voter hypothesis
14.4 The ethical voter hypothesis
14.5 Ethical preferences as selfish behavior
14.6 The selfish voter
14.7 Summary and implications
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 15 Rent seeking
15.1 The theory of rent seeking
15.1.1 The basic rent-seeking model with a fixed number of players
15.1.2 The impact of free entry
15.1.3 Rent seeking with sequential investments
15.1.4 Relaxing the assumptions
15.2 Rent seeking through regulation
15.3 Rent seeking and the political process
15.4 Rent seeking through tariffs and quotas
15.4.1 The economic effects of tariffs, quotas, and voluntary export restraints
15.4.2 Endogenous protection models
15.4.3 Remaining puzzles
15.5 Rent seeking in other governmental activities
15.6 How large are the welfare losses from rent seeking?
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 16 Bureaucracy
16.1 Uncertainty, information, and power
16.2 The budget-maximizing bureaucrat
16.2.1 Environment and incentives
16.2.2 The model
16.3 Extensions of the model
16.3.1 Alternative institutional assumptions
16.3.2 Bargaining between sponsor and bureau
16.4 Alternative behavioral assumptions
16.4.1 The slack-maximizing bureaucrat
16.4.2 The risk-avoiding bureaucrat
16.5 Empirical tests
16.5.1 Power of the agenda setter
16.5.2 Cost differences between publicly and privately provided services
16.6 The government as Leviathan
16.6.1 Theory
16.6.2 Empirical testing – government expenditures and taxes
16.7 Conclusions
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 17 Legislatures and bureaucracies
17.1 The Congressional-dominance model
17.1.1 Congressional dominance through administrative structure
17.1.2 Congressional dominance through administrative procedure
17.2 The impact of uncertainty and transaction costs
17.2.1 Uncertainty and the locus of responsibility
17.2.2 Uncertainty, transaction costs, and commitment
17.3 Congress and the president
17.3.1 The legislature controls the president
17.3.2 Presidential control over the legislature
17.3.3 The problem of deadlocks
17.4 Congress, the president, and the judiciary
17.4.1 Adding the judiciary to the model
17.4.2 The goals of the judiciary
17.5 Legislative decision making in the European Union
17.6 Conclusions
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 18 Dictatorship
18.1 The origins of dictatorship
18.2 The goals of dictators
18.2.1 The consumption of the dictator
18.2.2 Power
18.2.3 Security
18.3 The functioning and survival of dictatorships
18.3.1 The utility-maximizing dictator
18.3.2 Tinpots and totalitarians
18.3.3 Selective strategies to survive
18.3.4 The dictator’s dilemma
18.3.5 The limits of totalitarianism
18.4 The rise and decline of dictatorships
18.5 Dictatorship and economic performance
18.5.1 The relative advantages of dictatorship and democracy
18.5.2 The relative economic performance of dictatorships and democracies
18.6 Conclusions
Bibliographical notes
PART IV Applications and testing
CHAPTER 19 Political competition and macroeconomic performance
19.1 Macroeconomic performance and political success
19.1.1 Vote and popularity functions
19.1.2 Whom do voters hold responsible?
19.2 Opportunistic politics
19.2.1 With myopic voters
19.2.2 With rational voters
19.3 Partisan politics
19.3.1 Partisan politics with retrospective voters
19.3.2 Partisan politics with rational, forward-looking voters
19.4 The evidence
19.4.1 Do politicians try to manipulate the macroeconomic environment?
19.4.2 Are there partisan biases?
19.4.3 Which theories fit the data best?
19.4.4 Additional evidence for the Alesina/Rosenthal model
19.4.5 Discussion
19.5 Voter behavior
19.5.1 Myopic, retrospective, rational
19.5.2 Sociotropic or egotropic
19.6 Politics and inflation
19.6.1 Hypotheses
19.6.2 The facts
19.6.3 Central bank independence
19.7 Deficits
19.7.1 The facts
19.7.2 Hypotheses
19.7.3 The evidence
19.8 Reflections
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 20 Interest groups, campaign contributions, and lobbying
20.1 The logic of collective action
20.2 Models of interest group behavior in politics
20.2.1 Informative campaigning in a Downsian model
20.2.2 Persuasive campaigning in a Downsian model
20.3 Empirical studies of the causes and consequences of campaign contributions
20.3.1 Votes for a candidate are a function of campaign expenditures
20.3.2 Determinants of campaign contributions
20.3.3 Determinants of representative voting behavior – campaign contributions
20.3.4 Determinants of representative voting behavior – ideology or pure survival?
20.3.5 Evaluation
20.4 Lobbying
20.5 The welfare effects of interest group activities
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 21 The size of government
21.1 The facts
21.2 Explanations for the size and growth of government
21.2.1 The government as provider of public goods and eliminator of externalities
21.2.2 The government as redistributor of income and wealth
21.2.3 Interest groups and the growth of government
21.2.4 Bureaucracy and the growth of government
21.2.5 Fiscal illusion
21.2.6 Tax elasticity
21.3 Conclusions
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 22 Government size and economic performance
22.1 The welfare losses from taxation
22.2 Government size and black market activity
22.3 Government size and corruption
22.4 Government size and economic productivity
22.5 Government size and economic growth
22.5.1 Methodological issues
22.5.2 The evidence
22.6 Government activity and the economic decline of nations
22.6.1 The logic
22.6.2 Empirical evidence
22.7 Conclusions
Bibliographical notes
PART V Normative public choice
CHAPTER 23 Social welfare functions
23.1 The Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function
23.2 Axiomatic social welfare functions
23.2.1 Fleming’s social welfare function
23.2.2 Harsanyi’s social welfare function
23.2.3 Two criticisms of Harsanyi’s social welfare function
23.2.4 Ng’s social welfare function
23.2.5 Nash’s and other multiplicative social welfare functions
23.3 What form of social welfare function is best?
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 24 The impossibility of a social ordering
24.1 Logic of the proof
24.2 Relaxing the postulates
24.2.1 Transitivity
24.2.2 Unrestricted domain
24.2.3 Independence of irrelevant alternatives
24.3 Strategy-proof social welfare functions
24.4 Implications for public choice
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 25 A just social contract
25.1 The social contract
25.2 The two principles of justice
25.3 Extensions of the theory to other political stages
25.4 Critique of the Rawlsian social contract
25.4.1 The social contract
25.4.2 The two principles of justice
25.4.3 Experimental evidence
25.5 Two utilitarian defenses of the maximin principle
25.5.1 Maximin as a means to obtain compliance
25.5.2 Maximin as a redistribution principle
25.6 The social contract as a constitution
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 26 The constitution as a utilitarian contract
26.1 The constitutional context
26.2 The two-action case
26.3 The constitutional contract
26.3.1 Optimal collective action with only identity uncertainty
26.3.2 Optimal collective action with identity and numbers uncertainty
26.4 Symmetric and asymmetric bans and obligations
26.5 Continuous actions with interdependent utilities
26.6 Decision-making costs
26.6.1 Prisoners’ dilemmas
26.6.2 Direct conflicts
26.7 Rights and obligations
26.8 Constitutions: contracts or conventions?
26.8.1 Constitutions as contracts
26.8.2 Constitutions as conventions
26.8.3 Discussion
26.9 Conclusions regarding two-stage theories of social choice
26.10 From the normative, two-stage theory of constitutions to hypothesis testing
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 27 Liberal rights and social choices
27.1 The theorem
27.2 Resolving the paradox
27.2.1 Rights over Pareto
27.2.2 Pareto trades of actions
27.2.3 Pareto trades of rights
27.3 Rights over social states versus rights over actions
27.4 Liberal rights and obligations
27.5 Constitutional rights and liberal rights
Bibliographical notes
PART VI What have we learned?
CHAPTER 28 Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics?
28.1 The failures of rational actor models of politics
28.2 The rational choice approach to modeling
28.3 The prediction of cycling
28.4 The predictions of spatial models
28.5 Predicting voting and free-riding
28.6 Can public choice contribute to the positive study of political institutions?
28.7 Has public choice contributed anything to the normative study of political institutions?
28.8 Conclusions
Bibliographical notes
CHAPTER 29 Allocation, redistribution, and public choice
References
Name index
Subject index
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