Urban Economics and Fiscal Policy 1st edition by Holger Sieg – Ebook PDF Instant Download/Delivery: 0691190844 , 978-0691190846
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ISBN 10: 0691190844
ISBN 13: 978-0691190846
Author: Holger Sieg
An innovative advanced-undergraduate and graduate-level textbook in urban economics
With more than half of today’s global GDP being produced by approximately four hundred metropolitan centers, learning about the economics of cities is vital to understanding economic prosperity. This textbook introduces graduate and upper-division undergraduate students to the field of urban economics and fiscal policy, relying on a modern approach that integrates theoretical and empirical analysis. Based on material that Holger Sieg has taught at the University of Pennsylvania, Urban Economics and Fiscal Policy brings the most recent insights from the field into the classroom.
Divided into short chapters, the book explores fiscal policies that directly shape economic issues in cities, such as city taxes, the provision of quality education, access to affordable housing, and protection from crime and natural hazards. For each issue, Sieg offers questions, facts, and background; illuminates how economic theory helps students engage with topics; and presents empirical data that shows how economic ideas play out in daily life. Throughout, the book pushes readers to think critically and immediately put what they are learning to use by applying cutting-edge theory to data.
Urban Economics and Fiscal Policy 1st Table of contents:
1. Introduction
1.1 Why Cities
1.2 New York City versus the United States of America
1.3 The City as a Public Sector Corporation
1.4 An International Perspective
1.5 Moving Forward
1.6 Problem Sets
I: The Economic Rationale of Cities
2. Agglomeration, Productivity, and Trade
2.1 Motivation
2.2 Economic Rationales for Geographic Concentration
2.2.1 Transportation, Commuting, and Communication Costs
2.2.2 Economies of Scale and Scope
2.2.3 Knowledge Spillovers and Agglomeration Externalities
2.3 Modeling Agglomeration Externalities
2.4 Transportation Costs and Trade
2.5 Measuring the Impact of Agglomeration Externalities on Firm Productivity
2.6 The Local Nature of Agglomeration Externalities
2.7 The Effects of Government Regulations
2.8 A Case Study: The Impact of Brexit on the City of London
2.9 Conclusions
2.10 Technical Appendix: Cost Functions
2.10.1 Cost-Efficient Production and Competition
2.10.2 Multiple Input Factors
2.11 Debate: Amazon’s Second HQ
2.12 Problem Sets
3. Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization
3.1 Motivation
3.2 A Brief History of Legal Doctrines of Federalism in the US
3.3 Fiscal Federalism
3.4 Centralization
3.5 The Budget of the Federal Government
3.6 A Case Study: Federal Flood Insurance
3.7 Decentralization
3.8 Heterogeneity in Preferences over Policies
3.8.1 Testing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism
3.8.2 Heterogeneity in Education Policies among US States
3.8.3 Heterogeneity in Fiscal Policies among the Largest US Cities
3.9 Social Learning and Experimentation
3.10 A Case Study: Special Economic Zones
3.11 Conclusions
3.12 Technical Appendix: Deriving Optimal Policies
3.13 Debate: Flood Insurance
3.14 Problem Sets
II: Efficient and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods in Cities
4. Efficient Provision of Local Public Goods and Services
4.1 Motivation
4.2 Efficient Public Good Provision
4.2.1 Defining Local Public Goods
4.2.2 Pure Public Goods
4.2.3 Congestion
4.3 Implementation and Mechanism Design
4.3.1 The Lindahl Mechanism
4.3.2 The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
4.4 Stated Preferences over Public Good Provision
4.5 Practical Implementation: Optimal Class Size
4.6 A Case Study: Berlin Brandenburg Airport
4.7 Conclusions
4.8 Technical Appendix A: Deriving the Optimality Conditions for the Baseline Model
4.9 Technical Appendix B: Deriving the Optimality Conditions for the Model with Congestion
4.10 Technical Appendix C: Applying the VCG Mechanism
4.10.1 The Planner’s Problem
4.10.2 Side Payments
4.10.3 Taxes
4.10.4 Incentives to Tell the Truth
4.11 Debate: Efficient Cities
4.12 Problem Sets
5. Voluntary Provision of Local Public Goods and Services
5.1 Motivation
5.2 A Model of Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
5.3 Empirical Evidence of Crowd-Out
5.4 Warm Glow and Private Benefits
5.5 Empirical Evidence: Private Benefits versus Warm Glow
5.6 Tax Incentives and Matching
5.7 Conclusions
5.8 Technical Appendix: Deriving the Nash Equilibrium
5.9 Debate: Tax Deductibility of Charitable Donations
5.10 Problem Sets
III: Political Economy of State and Local Governments
6. Local Political Institutions in the US
6.1 Motivation
6.2 A Brief History of Local Governments in the US
6.3 Characterizing Municipal Governments in the US
6.4 Legal Foundations of Municipal Governments
6.5 Direct Democracy
6.5.1 Initiative, Referendum, and Recall
6.5.2 A Case Study: Fracking in Athens, Ohio
6.6 Representative Democracy
6.6.1 Local Forms of Government
6.6.2 Partisan versus Nonpartisan Elections
6.6.3 A Case Study: Electoral Reform in Asheville, NC
6.6.4 Term Limits
6.7 Conclusions
6.8 Debate: Mayor-Council versus Council-Manager
6.9 Problem Sets
7. Voting over Local Public Good Provision
7.1 Motivation
7.2 Majority Rule in a Direct Democracy
7.2.1 The Median Voter Theorem
7.2.2 Sequential Voting
7.2.3 Vote Buying, Vote Trading, and Log Rolling
7.3 Representative Democracy
7.4 Is the Median-Income Voter Decisive? Empirical Evidence
7.5 Discussion
7.5.1 Dimensionality of the Policy Space
7.5.2 Ideology and Competence
7.5.3 Accountability and Competence
7.5.4 Voter Turnout
7.6 A Case Study: The Role of Money in State and Local Politics
7.7 Conclusions
7.8 Technical Appendix: The Public Good Provision Problem
7.9 Debate: City Politics
7.10 Problem Sets
8. Household Mobility and Fiscal Competition
8.1 Motivation
8.2 Sorting and Competition among Municipalities
8.3 Capitalization: Empirical Evidence
8.4 Competition and Efficiency: Empirical Evidence
8.5 A Case Study: The Benefits of Consolidation
8.6 Income Stratification and Voting
8.7 Segregation and Sorting by Race
8.8 Conclusions
8.9 Technical Appendix: Optimal Locational Choices
8.9.1 Modeling Fiscal Competition
8.9.2 Imperfect Sorting by Income
8.10 Debate: City-County Merger
8.11 Problem Sets
9. Spillovers, Fiscal Inequality, and Intergovernmental Transfers
9.1 Motivation
9.2 Heterogeneity in Intergovernmental Transfers among the Largest US Cities
9.3 Fiscal Spillover Effects
9.4 Inequality and Fairness
9.5 Different Types of Intergovernmental Grants
9.6 Poverty and Intergovernmental Transfers
9.7 Conclusions
9.8 Technical Appendix: Solving the Model with Spillovers
9.9 Debate: School Finance Equalization Laws
9.10 Problem Sets
10. Rent-Seeking Behavior
10.1 Motivation
10.2 Modeling Rent-Seeking Behavior
10.3 Empirical Evidence
10.3.1 State Bond Ratings
10.3.2 Corruption and Accountability: Evidence from Brazil
10.4 A Case Study: Procurement Auctions in Puerto Rico
10.5 Conclusions
10.6 Technical Appendix: Computing the Equilibrium of the All-Pay Auction
10.7 Debate: Term Limits
10.8 Problem Sets
11. Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining
11.1 Motivation
11.2 Employer and Union Rights and Obligations
11.3 The Theory of Bargaining and Negotiations
11.3.1 A Bargaining Model
11.3.2 Employment and Wage Negotiations
11.3.3 Discussion
11.4 Components of Municipal Labor Policy
11.4.1 Wages and Salaries
11.4.2 Employment and Work Rules
11.4.3 Benefits and Pension Funding
11.5 Funding of Pension Plans
11.6 A Case Study: Collective Bargaining in Philadelphia
11.7 Conclusions
11.8 Technical Appendix: A Bargaining Model
11.9 Debate: Pay-as-You-Go
11.10 Problem Sets
IV: The Determination of City Taxes
12. Property Taxation
12.1 Motivation
12.2 Justifications of the Property Tax
12.2.1 The Property Tax as a Benefit Tax
12.2.2 The Property Tax as a Tax on Capital
12.2.3 The Impact of Property Taxes on Renters
12.2.4 Fairness
12.2.5 Other Administrative Advantages
12.3 Property Tax Compliance
12.3.1 Some Evidence
12.3.2 Modeling Property Tax Compliance Behavior
12.3.3 The Effectiveness of Nudge Strategies
12.4 Property Tax Limitations and Commercial Property Tax Exemptions
12.5 Alternatives to the Property Tax
12.5.1 Is a Land Tax a Better Alternative
12.5.2 A Case Study: The Soda Tax in Philadelphia
12.6 Conclusions
12.7 Debate: Property versus Income Taxation
12.8 Problem Sets
13. Business Taxation and Economic Development
13.1 Motivation
13.2 Empirical Evidence on Firm Sorting
13.3 A Model of Firm Location Choices
13.4 Tax Policy and Firm Location
13.5 Business Taxation in Practice
13.6 Tax Increment Financing and Community Development
13.7 A Case Study: The Relocation of UBS
13.8 Conclusions
13.9 Technical Appendix: The Derivation of the Profit Function
13.10 Debate: Reforming Business Taxation
13.11 Problem Sets
V: The Practice of Urban Fiscal Policies
14. Municipal Budgeting and Planning
14.1 Motivation
14.2 Priorities and Mission Statement
14.3 Operating Budget
14.3.1 Revenues
14.3.2 Expenses
14.3.3 Flexible Budgets
14.4 Capital Budget
14.5 Forecasting
14.5.1 Revenue Forecasting
14.5.2 Cost and Expenditure Forecasting
14.6 Benefit-Cost Analysis
14.7 Conclusions
14.8 Debate: Hosting the Super Bowl
14.9 Problem Sets
15. Fiscal Policies and Fiscal Crisis
15.1 Motivation
15.2 Data
15.3 Expenditure Policies
15.4 Revenue Policies
15.5 Common Policy Mistakes
15.5.1 Labor Policies
15.5.2 Redistribution and Tax Policies
15.5.3 Economic Development Policies
15.6 Municipal Bankruptcies
15.7 A Case Study: The Detroit Bankruptcy
15.8 A Case Study: The Fiscal Crisis and Recovery of Pittsburgh
15.9 Conclusions
15.10 Debate: Fiscal Policies in NYC under Mayor de Blasio
15.11 Problem Sets
16. Debt Finance and Municipal Bond Markets
16.1 Motivation
16.2 Key Players in the Municipal Bond Markets
16.3 Bond Characteristics
16.4 New York City’s Participation in Municipal Bond Markets
16.4.1 Data
16.4.2 Volume and Amount Issued over Time
16.4.3 Municipal Bond Ratings over Time
16.5 A Case Study: Build America Bonds
16.6 Conclusions
16.7 Debate: Tax Exemption of Municipal Bonds
16.8 Problem Sets
VI: Managing Urban Challenges
17. Urban Poverty
17.1 Motivation
17.2 Defining Poverty
17.3 Differences in Poverty by Race
17.4 Human Capital and Poverty
17.5 How DoWelfare Programs Change the Budget Set
17.6 The Adverse Incentive Effects ofWelfare Programs
17.7 Reforming Welfare Programs
17.7.1 Work Incentives
17.7.2 Welfare Limits and TANF
17.7.3 Extending the Earned Income Tax Credit
17.7.4 Work Requirements for Public Housing
17.8 Discrimination and Affirmative Action Programs
17.9 Place-Based Policies
17.10 Conclusions
17.11 Technical Appendix: Incentive Effects
17.12 Debate: Time Limits andWork Requirements
17.13 Problem Sets
18. The Provision of Education in Urban School Districts
18.1 Motivation
18.2 Some Facts about Urban School Districts
18.3 Education as Human Capital Investment
18.4 How Large Are the Returns to Human Capital
18.5 Public Provision of Primary and Secondary Education
18.6 Two Case Studies: Philadelphia and Pittsburgh
18.7 Early Childhood Education
18.8 Reforming Urban Primary and Secondary Schools
18.8.1 Accountability and No Child Left Behind
18.8.2 Classroom Size Reductions
18.8.3 Magnet Schools
18.8.4 Charter Schools
18.8.5 Teacher Quality and Compensation
18.8.6 Vouchers and Private Schools
18.9 Conclusions
18.10 Debate: Pay for Performance for Teachers
18.11 Problem Sets
19. Crime and Public Safety
19.1 Motivation
19.2 An Economic Model of Crime
19.3 Policy Implications
19.4 The Economics of Organized Crime
19.5 Police Effectiveness
19.6 The Demand for Addictive Goods
19.7 A Case Study: The Prohibition Experience
19.8 Decriminalization of “Soft” Drugs
19.9 Conclusions
19.10 Technical Appendix: Optimal Gang Size
19.11 Debate: Legalizing Marijuana
19.12 Problem Sets
20. Urban Environmental Challenges
20.1 Motivation
20.2 Negative Production Externalities
20.3 Empirical Evidence on Measuring the Negative Effects of Air Pollution
20.4 Heterogeneity in Abatement Costs
20.5 A Case Study: The Clean Air Act
20.6 Regulation under Uncertainty
20.7 A Case Study: The Flint Water Crisis
20.8 The Impact of Global Warming on Cities
20.9 A Case Study: Redesigning Flood Zones in NYC
20.10 A Case Study: Rebuilding New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina
20.11 Conclusions
20.12 Technical Appendix: Solving the Model of Externalities
20.13 Debate: Lessons from Flint
20.14 Problem Sets
21. Managing Cities in Developing Countries
21.1 Motivation
21.2 The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty
21.3 Trust and Making Credible Commitments
21.4 The Consequences of Weak Institutions
21.4.1 Local Corruption
21.4.2 Lack of Local Fiscal Capacity
21.4.3 Lack of Physical Capital
21.4.4 Rural to Urban Migration
21.4.5 A Case Study: The Hukou System
21.5 Natural Hazards
21.6 Conclusions
21.7 Technical Appendix: Solving the Optimal Taxation Problem
21.8 Debate: Transportation Infrastructure Investments in Jakarta
21.9 Problem Sets
VII: Urban Land, Housing, and Labor Markets
22. The Internal Structure of Cities
22.1 Motivation
22.2 Traffic Congestion in Large US Cities
22.3 Modeling Internal City Structure
22.4 The Price of Land in New York City
22.5 Modern Models of the Internal Structure of Cities
22.6 Transportation Networks and City Structure
22.7 A Case Study: Congestion Pricing in Singapore and New York City
22.8 A Case Study: The NYC Subway Crisis
22.9 Conclusions
22.10 Technical Appendix: Endogenous Land Use
22.11 Debate: Public Transportation Infrastructure
22.12 Problem Sets
23. Land and Housing Markets
23.1 Motivation
23.2 The Hedonic Model of Housing
23.3 Using Hedonic Models in Empirical Work
23.4 Housing Prices in LA
23.5 Land Prices in NYC
23.6 Housing Policies and Regulation
23.6.1 Housing Supply Regulations
23.6.2 Rent Control and Rent Stabilization
23.6.3 Public Housing Policies
23.7 Conclusions
23.8 Technical Appendix: Computing the Equilibrium in the Hedonic Model
23.9 Debate: Zoning Policies in NYC
23.10 Problem Sets
24. Local Labor Markets
24.1 Motivation
24.2 The Urban Wage Premium
24.3 Modeling Differences in Local Labor Markets
24.3.1 A Baseline Model
24.3.2 Extensions
24.4 Theory and Measurement
24.5 Location-Based Policies
24.6 Conclusions
24.7 Debate: Attracting the “Creative Class
24.8 Problem Sets
25. Homeownership, Mortgage Markets, and Default
25.1 Motivation
25.2 Measuring the Evolution of Housing Prices in a Market
25.3 The Moral Hazard of Renting and the Cost of Homeownership
25.4 A Case Study: Why Are Young Americans Not Buying Houses
25.5 Mortgages and Default
25.6 Mortgage Markets
25.7 A Case Study: The Bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
25.8 Mortgage Insurance
25.9 Conclusions
25.10 Debate: Subsidies for Homeownership
25.11 Problem Sets
26. Epilogue
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